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China's Economic Growth and its Real Exchange Rate* 
 
Abstract 
  Pressure from abroad to revalue China’s currency appears to associate its rapid economic 
growth with the likelihood of a real appreciation.  In a world of open economies and 
differentiated traded goods, however, development-related productivity and endowment growth 
shocks tend to cause real depreciations, the principal exception being the Balassa case where 
non-traded service sectors are large and productivity growth is considerably faster in traded 
sectors.  Yet China is special amongst developing countries because its labour force is likely to 
decline in future and this will cause upward pressure on its real exchange rate.  This paper 
quantifies the links between growth shocks and the Chinese real exchange rate using a dynamic 
model of the global economy with open capital accounts and full demographic underpinnings to 
labour supply.  The results suggest that, in the short run, the dominant force is financial capital 
inflows, which are appreciating.  In the long run demographic forces prove to be weak relative to 
skill transformation and services sector productivity.  These are both comparatively powerful and 
depreciating.  While financial capital inflows driven by expected appreciation may be self-
fulfilling in the short run, these results suggest that the fundamental forces are more likely to 




The underlying trend of China’s real exchange rate is of critical importance to Chinese 
macroeconomic policy and to the global capital market.  A recent influx of financial capital, 
combined with international political pressure to revalue the Renminbi (RMB), implies an 
expected appreciation.
1  If it is also expected that the Peoples Bank of China will give future 
priority to domestic price stability, anticipation of an underlying real appreciation is implied. 
Yet real growth is associated with technical advances and factor accumulation, both of 
which reduce costs relative to those in less rapidly expanding trading partners.  Growth shocks 
might therefore be expected to depreciate the real exchange rate.  Indeed, real depreciations must 
occur in countries subjected to growth shocks when all home goods are tradeable and imperfectly 
but equally substitutable with foreign goods.
2  The story is more complex, however, when 
tradability varies across a country’s goods and services and technical change is slower in the non-
traded sectors.  Then, growth has a Balassa (1964) dimension whereby it is imagined that 
comparatively low wages and per capita incomes in developing economies are due to their 
                                                 
1 The surge in private inflows is noted by Prasad and Wei (2005).  The claim that the RMB is mercantilistically 
undervalued occurs frequently in the scholarly literature, as in Dooley et al. (2004) and Eizenman and Lee (2006), 
and in more partisan political fora, as in of Bernanke (2006). 
2 Of course, this is not so in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson fundamental model of trade, which has homogeneous 
products and no trade costs.  There is, however, considerable accumulated evidence confirming the failure of the law 
of one price for tradable goods.  See, for example, Bergin, Glick and Taylor (2004), Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis 
(2005), Drine and Rault (2005) and Bergin and Glick (2006).  Differentiation therefore seems the appropriate place 
to begin.   3
comparatively low factor productivity in tradable goods sectors.
3  Productivity contrasts are seen 
in this context as less great in non-traded service sectors, particularly for services that are labour 
intensive in both developing and industrialised economies.  As growth ensues and productivity 
converges on industrial economy levels, real wages are driven up more quickly than labour 
productivity in non-tradable services.  While the prices of tradable goods are constrained by 
imports, those of non-traded services rise, placing upward pressure on the real exchange rate. 
Yet overall GDP growth stems not only from tradeable productivity improvements.  For 
one thing, in many expanding developing countries productivity has been found to grow quickly 
in non-traded services.
4  More importantly, however, there are numerous changes in factor 
endowments due to demographic change, the skilling of the labour force, changes in saving rates 
and financial reforms that lead to declining investment premia and expanded financial capital 
inflows.  Population growth and skill-upgrading expand endowments of labour and human 
capital, while changes in saving rates and interest premia alter the rate of growth of the physical 
capital endowment.  Other things equal, factor endowment growth relative to trading partners 
reduces the home real exchange rate.  The net effect therefore depends on the pattern of 
endowment changes and the sectoral distributions of productivity growth and tradability.  In 
China’s case, however, demographic change would appear to be of particular importance.  
Unusually for a country of its level of development, fertility is low and declining and population 
and labour force growth are slowing, with the likelihood that they will begin to decline within the 
next decade.
5  Other things equal, this should foster growth in real wages and therefore tend to 
appreciate the real exchange rate. 
This paper explores these interactions for the case of China in a dynamic numerical model 
of the global economy that embodies full demographic behaviour.  To identify conditions under 
which the Chinese real exchange rate will appreciate, changes to population policy, skill-
upgrading rates, saving rates, financial reform and factor productivity growth are introduced, the 
latter differentially across the food, industrial and services sectors.  While the modelling confirms 
the Balassa conjecture that productivity growth in the tradeable sectors alone leads to real 
appreciation, the majority of the growth-related shocks considered place downward pressure on 
the real exchange rate.  Demographic change proves not to be a major determinant.  In the short 
run increased net capital account inflows, as might be induced by financial reform, prove 
dominant and are appreciating while, in the long run skill-upgrading and services productivity are 
                                                 
3 See Balassa (1964) and, more peripherally, Samuelson (1964). 
4 See Miyajima (2005). 
5 See Golley and Tyers (2006).   4
both dominant and depreciating.  A predisposition toward real depreciation is suggested in the 
long run.  The section to follow briefly reviews the recent debate about the RMB, the patterns of 
real exchange rate change in East Asian economies and the evidence on Chinese productivity 
growth.  Section 3 then describes the global model used and Section 4 discusses the adopted 
baseline simulation to 2030.  Section 5 then describes the use of the model to construct time paths 
of elasticities of China’s real exchange rate to alternative growth shocks.  Section 6 then 
concludes. 
 
2 The RMB Debate and the Evidence on Productivity 
While the People’s Bank of China has long been committed to maintaining a stable 
nominal exchange rate, there is increasing pressure for the Chinese authorities to allow the 
currency to float more freely.
6  Many analysts believe that this will necessarily lead to a further 
appreciation of the RMB (as it has done, albeit slowly, since the relaxation of the de facto US 
dollar peg in July 2005).  Yet it is not guaranteed that the only way the RMB can go is up.  While 
the majority of recent scholarly research finds undervaluation
7, a number of studies do not.
8  
Prasad et al. (2005) point to the potential for depreciation following the gradual liberalisation of 
the capital account, which could lead to net outflows as domestic investors seek to diversify their 
portfolios.
9  Moreover, there is already substantial evidence of (informal) private outflows from 
China (Prasad and Wei, 2005), which would be expected to expand if legalised, placing further 
downward pressure on the exchange rate.  In addition, the recent surge in speculative inflows in 
anticipation of appreciation is likely to be temporary and could easily be reversed.
10  In essence, 
if and when the People’s Bank of China (PBC) introduces a yet more flexible exchange rate 
regime, it seems possible that anything could happen.  One thing is clear, however: with a freely 
floating exchange rate, the PBC is likely to follow the practice of central banks abroad and focus 
on the control of inflation.  This means that the forces underlying real exchange rate dynamics 
will also determine the path of the nominal exchange rate. 
                                                 
6 See Lardy (2006), Prasad et al. (2005), Prasad and Rajan (2006) and Bernanke (2006). 
7 See Frankel (2004), who finds that the RMB was undervalued by 36% in 2000, Goldstein (2004), who claim it was 
undervalued by 15-30% in 2004 and Coudert and Couharde (2005), who find the undervaluation to be larger. 
8 See Dunaway and Li (2005) for a survey, including one that finds overvaluation (Wang, 2004, 2005).  Tyers et al. 
(2007) use a structural model to find evidence of undervaluation in the mid to late 1990s but offer no clear finding 
for 2004. 
9 Whether this happens or not depends on whether the PBC’s current policy of soaking up domestic saving by issuing 
its own bonds, and then purchasing foreign bonds on behalf of its citizenry, offers a national portfolio with more or 
less foreign assets than would emerge in the absence of interventionist central banking and with an open capital 
account.  This is noted by Prasad et al. (2005) and it is a weakness in the partisan case made by Bernanke (2006). 
10 According to Fan (2006), speculative inflows were as high as USD 105 billion in 2004.  See also Prasad and Wei 
(2005).   5
In a world of open economies and differentiated tradable goods, productivity and factor 
endowment growth shocks tend to cause real depreciations.  The key issues, then, are the scale 
and sectoral distribution of productivity shocks, tradability and the direction of endowment 
shocks.  With regard to the latter, demographic change would appear to be important for China.  
Cai and Wang (2005) claim that about one-quarter of per capita GDP growth between 1980 and 
2003 can be attributed to the “demographic dividend”, associated with the high proportion of the 
population in the working-age range during this period.
11  This has played a critical role in 
keeping wages – and hence the real exchange rate – low, thereby enabling the rapid expansion of 
labour-intensive manufacturing exports.  However, Cai and Wang predict that this dividend will 
be exhausted in China by the year 2015, after which the aged dependency ratio will rise steadily, 
reaching 40 per cent by 2030.
12  The upward pressure that this will exert on real wages and, 
therefore, the real exchange rate makes China a unique case among developing countries. 
While there is considerable debate over the precise figures, there is little doubt that total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth has made a positive contribution to China’s overall economic 
growth during the reform period.  Chow and Lin (2002) analyse aggregate economic growth 
during the period 1978 to 1998 using standard Cobb-Douglas growth accounting, showing that 
economy-wide TFP grew at 2.6% and accounted for 29% of GDP growth during this period.  
Wang and Yao (2003) incorporate human capital accumulation into their growth accounting 
(arguing that failing to do so places an upward bias on TFP estimates), but still find that TFP 
contributed 25.4% to China’s real GDP growth rate during the period 1978-1999.
13  If it is 
assumed that these studies imply economy-wide productivity improvements China’s TFP record 
could be said to have contributed to its low real exchange rate. 
Yet the Balassa story depends on sectoral contrasts in productivity performance and, in 
particular, on productivity growth in relatively non-tradable services.  If the non-traded sector is 
large enough and its productivity growth lags sufficiently behind that of traded sectors then 
wages rise with tradable productivity, pushing up relative service prices and thereby placing 
upward pressure on the real exchange rate.  The empirical evidence from searches for dominant 
Balassa effects in rapidly growing developing countries is mixed, however.  Choudhri and Khan 
(2004) find evidence for it from a small sample of developing countries that does not include 
                                                 
11 See Bloom and Williamson (1998) for a generic discussion of the demographic dividend in developing countries. 
12 Tyers and Golley (2006) confirm this, finding that the non-working aged dependency ratio could rise to 43 per 
cent. 
13 See also Wang and Fan (2000), who estimate China’s average annual TFP growth to be 1.46% between 1979 and 
1999; Wang and Yao (2003) find that the rate was 2.32% between 1978 and 1998; Young (2003),  using new human 
capital data and drawing on official and unofficial data to find TFP growth of 1.4% between 1978 and 1998; Islam et 
al. (2005) place average TFP at 2.26% between 1978 and 2002; and Guo and Jia (2005), who use frontier analysis to 
estimate China’s TFP, derive a relatively low annual rate at 0.891%.   6
Mainland China, Taiwan or Hong Kong.  Miyajima (2005) focuses on growth spurts and finds 
contradictory evidence, stemming in part from high rates of services productivity growth in some 
countries during periods of comparatively rapid expansion. 
Indeed, the East Asian evidence associating real appreciations with growth surges is 
certainly mixed.  Figure 1 plots bilateral real exchange rates against the US for Mainland China 
and some of its neighbours since 1980.  There is no clear pattern.
14  This could suggest that the 
Balassa effect is offset by the scale of across-the-board productivity gains or, consistent with the 
story offered by Aizenman and Lee (2006), by mercantilistic sapping of domestic aggregate 
demand through the soaking up of home savings and the “hoarding” of foreign reserves.  Applied 
to mainland China, however, the latter argument could founder on the effectiveness of capital 
controls in preventing foreign holdings by private firms and households.  To explore the 
productivity issue further, we turn to the China-focussed literature.  This is mainly in Chinese and 
it is dominated by the work of Lu Feng at the China Center for Economic Research, Peking 
University.
15 
In his most comprehensive study, Lu (2006a) estimates labour productivity in China’s 
manufacturing and service sectors between 1978 and 2004.  He describes the evolution of 
China’s manufacturing labour productivity after 1978 as a two-stage process: during the first 
stage (1978-1990) it was only 1.9% per year, compared with a per capita GDP growth rate of 
7.5%; while during the second stage (1991-2004) it increased dramatically, averaging 13.1%, 
significantly higher than the official per capita GDP growth rate of 8.2%.  Labour productivity in 
the service sector averaged 4.3% per year over the entire period.  He divides manufacturing 
labour productivity by service labour productivity to get yearly estimates of relative tradable to 
non-tradable labour productivity.  Assuming a value of 100 in 1978, this reveals that relative 
productivity dropped to 84 in 1990 but rose rapidly thereafter, reaching 276 in 2004.  He then 
calculates manufacturing/services relative labour productivity in the US and 13 OECD economies 
over the same period, and uses these to construct comparative labour productivity indices for 
China in terms of the US and the OECD.  Both indices show the same trend, dropping between 
1978 and 1991 and increasing strongly between 1994 and 2004. 
Lu asserts that this pattern is demonstrative of the RMB’s early overvaluation and 
subsequent undervaluation.  In particular, he takes the view that the rapid growth of Chinese 
manufacturing productivity since 1994 (relative to Chinese services and also to US and OECD 
                                                 
14 Korea is a possible exception if the period is divided into episodes.  Prior to the Asian financial crisis it was 
appreciating, losing ground during the crisis and commencing an appreciating trend again thereafter. 
15 See Lu (2006a, 2006b, 2007) and Lu and Han (2006).   7
manufacturing productivity) suggests a trend of real exchange rate appreciation in this period.  
The fact that this pattern is not borne out in the Chinese real exchange rate series of Figure 1 
suggests that the tendency for relative productivity to cause real appreciation has been more than 
offset by the corresponding tendencies for across-the-board productivity growth, relative factor 
accumulation and Aizenman-Lee reserve hoarding to cause real depreciation. 
Assumptions about factor productivity in the traded and service sectors are clearly critical 
determinants of real exchange rate changes.  Yet there are numerous measurement difficulties, 
including the undercounting of industrial employment in China due to the influx of unregistered 
rural workers to urban areas, the lack of clear volume measures for services and of quality or 
composition adjustments to estimates of the capital stock.
16  To clarify our own perspective, we 
chose to re-examine the data for China since 1986. 
 
A reassessment of recent productivity growth in China 
We estimate simple Solow residuals for the economy as a whole and for three sectors: 
“Food”, “Industry” and “Services”.
17  Assuming Hicks neutral technological progress and 
constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, the annual Solow residual takes the form: 





=− − − , 
where Y is output, K  is physical capital and L is labour, at all skill levels.  α is the elasticity of 
output to the capital stock and the capital share of value added.  We apply this relationship to 
annual data from 1985 to 2005 for the economy as a whole and for the three sectors.
18  From the 
China Statistical Abstract (2006), we obtain constant price indices on for “primary industry”, 
“secondary industry”, “tertiary industry” and construction.  These broad sectors are not precise 
fits to the sectors we define, however, so we construct deflators from constant and current price 
industry output indices.  We then use these to restructure the price and output quantity statistics 
by sector.  This gives us output series in constant 2000 prices for “food”, “industry” and 
                                                 
16 While quality adjusted volume measures are available for most primary products and manufactures there is 
generally no comparable quality-adjusted measure of services volume and hence no accurate index of service prices.  
The same point can be made about the capital stock – in most countries it is increasingly computation-intensive, yet 
the price of computation services has declined relative to those of other capital goods.  Standard estimates of capital 
stocks tend therefore to be underestimates. 
17 The “Food” sector is defined as Primary Industry plus Food processing, “Industry” as Secondary Industry minus 
Construction and Food processing, while “Services” as Tertiary Industry plus Construction. 
18 Output data are from the China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book 
(every year after 1985) and China Statistical Abstract (2006). Employment data are from China Statistical Year Book 
(2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year 
Book (every year after 1985).  China’s capital stock, at 2000 prices, is from Holtz (2006).   8
“services”.
19  The implied rates of annual sectoral and GDP price inflation are illustrated in 
Figure 2 and the corresponding price indices are shown in Figure 3.  For the period as a whole 
relative service price inflation is somewhat obscured by rises in primary product prices.  For the 
relatively stable fixed exchange rate period beyond 1995 the pattern is clearer, however.  In that 
period service prices have clearly inflated relative to those of traded merchandise. 
A particular difficulty in the case of China concerns statistics on labour use.  According to 
Cai and Wang (2006), China’s officially published urban employment data may be 
underestimated due to the omission of workers present in urban areas “unofficially”, without 
urban registration.  They estimate the unrecorded “residual” in urban employment data at 11.3 per 
cent between 1991 and 1995, 23.8% in 1996-2000 and 38.4% in 2001-2004.  We therefore 
enlarge employment in industry and services from 1991 to 2005 based on the proportions 
estimated by Cai and Wang. 
In order to estimate the Solow residual separately for each of the three sectors, the capital 
stock must be split between them.  To do this we assume rates of return on physical capital do not 
differ greatly between sectors and hence that the sectoral distribution of physical capital use is the 
same as that of expenditure on capital.  For the latter, we use the sectoral splits of “operating 
surplus” in China’s input-output tables for 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, and 2002.
20  Finally, we need 
estimates for the capital share of value added, α .  Again, we use the input-output tables.  
Ignoring “net taxes on production” and “total depreciation of fixed assets”, we take total value 
added as the sum of “operating surplus” and “compensation of labour”.  The capital share is then 
the share of operating surplus in this total.
21 
  The average annual changes in the Solow residuals for each sector are given in Table 1.  
These show strong productivity performance by the Chinese economy since the mid-1980s, with 
a slowdown in the 1998-2001 period associated with the Asian financial crisis and the post-
millennium stock market corrections.
22  Consistent with the analysis of Lu (2006a), productivity 
                                                 
19 The availability of constant and current price statistics notwithstanding, for reasons indicated previously, we are 
not sanguine about the accuracy of the resulting price series, and particularly that for services. 
20 Operating surplus is  ii rK  where ri is the return rate to capital in sector i and aggregate compensation to capital is 
ii rK rK =∑ , wherer and  K  are the aggregate capital return rate and the physical capital stock.  We assume that 
i rr =  for all i, making it possible add the operating surpluses and allocate them sectorally (‘food’ needs to be split 
between the value-added shares of Food Processing and Food Manufacturing).  Then, for each of the three sectors, 
the share of capital stock is given by:  ii ii rK rK ∑ . 
21 Our estimates of α  are smallest for the “food” sector and largest for the “industry” sector.  There is an important 
trend, however, for industry to become less capital intensive and both “food” and “services” to become more capital 
intensive.  In 2005, the shares are food: 14%, industry: 40%, services 32%. 
22 The productivity performance in this period appears to have remained strong in the industrial sector while 
deteriorating in food and services.  This may be a statistical aberration caused by the overall economic slow-down in 
this period and the retreat of unrecorded workers from industry to agriculture and services.   9
growth appears to have been strongest in the industrial sector.  The averages disguise higher 
recent productivity growth in the food sector however, as rural to urban migration accelerates.
23  
Importantly, the growth rate of productivity in services is always slower than in the tradeable 
sectors.  Yet, particularly in recent years, the differences are not large.  While this offers the 
standard Balassa explanation for the relative inflation in the services sector that is indicated in 
Figure 3, the gap has been clearly insufficient to overcome long run depreciating forces.  To 
further explore the relative strengths of the many forces on the real exchange rate we resort to the 
use of a numerical model. 
 
3 The Model 
The approach adopted follows Tyers and Shi (2007a, b), in that it encompasses both 
demographic and economic change.  Our initial emphasis on the demography stems first from our 
expectation that China’s eventual labour force slow-down would place upward pressure on real 
wages and, therefore, on the real exchange rate.  Second, since China’s service sector is relatively 
intensive in skilled labour, the real exchange rate is also likely to be sensitive to the rate at which 
production worker families acquire skill.  A complete demographic sub-model is therefore 
integrated within a dynamic numerical model of the global economy in which regional 




The demographic sub-model tracks populations in four age groups, two genders and two skill 
categories: a total of 16 population groups in each of the 14 regions listed in Table 2.
25  The four 
age groups are the dependent young, adults of fertile and working age, older working adults and 
the mostly-retired over 60s.  The skill subdivision is between households that provide production 
labour (unskilled) and those that provide professional labour (skilled).
26  Each age-gender-skill 
group is a homogeneous sub-population with a group-specific birth and death rate and rates of 
                                                 
23 The omission of the skill content of the labour force probably contributes to what appear to be rates that are on the 
high side.  Aside from the cautionary notes already mentioned, changes in the composition of the capital stock 
inevitably lead to the underestimation of its real value and hence to overestimation of Solow residuals. 
24 The model has its origins in GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version of which is a derivative of its comparative static 
progenitor, GTAP (Hertel, 1997).  Its dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000). 
25 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in dependency ratios.  
For more complete documentation, see Chan and Tyers (2007). 
26 The subdivision between production and professional labour accords with the ILO’s occupation-based 
classification and is consistent with the labour division adopted in the GTAP Database.  See Liu et al. (1998).   10
both immigration and emigration.
27  The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured 
life expectancy at 60, which varies across genders and regions.  The key demographic 
parameters, then, are birth rates, sex ratios at birth, age-gender specific death, immigration and 
emigration rates and life expectancies at 60.  The birth rates, life expectancies at 60 and the age 
specific mortality rates all trend through time asymptotically, converging on exogenous target 
levels.  In particular, the declining trend in Chinese fertility extends the fall during the decade 
prior to the base year (1997) in an asymptotic approach toward, but not reaching, the birth rate 
observed in Japan in that year.
28 
A further key parameter is the rate at which each region’s education and social development 
institutions transform production worker families into professional worker families.  Each year a 
particular proportion of the population in each production worker age-gender group is transferred 
to professional (skilled) status.  These proportions depend on the regions’ levels of development, 
the associated capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of their production and 
professional labour forces.  The resulting rates of transformation are based on changes during the 
decade prior to the base year, 1997, in the composition of aggregate regional labour forces as 
between production and professional workers.  They are constant within each region and through 
time and have the consequences for changes in skill endowments through time indicated in Table 
3.
29  The share of China’s labour force that is skilled (professional) is projected to rise through 
time while that in North America remains static.  The contrast is due to North America’s higher 
initial skill share, its high rate of unskilled immigration and its higher fertility rate. 
 
Labour Force 
To evaluate the number of “full-time equivalent” workers we first construct labour force 
participation rates, by gender and age group for each region from ILO statistics on the 
“economically active population”.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are part-
time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work.  The result is 
the number of full-time equivalents per worker.
30  For each age-gender group and region, a target 
                                                 
27 Mothers in families providing skilled labour are assumed to produce children who will grow up to be skilled 
workers.  The children of mothers in production worker families are correspondingly assumed to become production 
workers, except that a fixed proportion of them are transformed into skilled workers each year. 
28 Since 1997 the Japanese fertility rate has fallen from 1.4 to 1.25.  These projections are slightly lower than those 
by the Development Research Centre of the State Council of China (2000) and Sharping (2003), yet the latter two 
make no attempt to allow Chinese fertility to follow the declining trends observed in neighbouring countries. 
29 Note that, as regions become more advanced and populations in the production worker families become 
comparatively small, the skill transformation rate has a diminishing effect on the professional population.  These 
transformation rates are held constant in this analysis but are made endogenous to real per capita incomes and to the 
skilled wage premium in Tyers, Bain and Vedi (2006). 
30 See Tyers et al. (2005: Tables 11 and 12) for further details.   11
country is identified whose participation rate is approached asymptotically.  China’s aged labour 
force participation is projected to rise slightly to allow for the expected shortfall in pension 
income as more retirees leave private sector employment.  This, combined with the effects of 
ageing, raises the trend of the labour force above that of the population, as indicated in Figure 4.  
Most striking in this figure, though, is the projected reversal of the trend in China’s labour 
supply. 
 
The Global Economic Model 
We adopt a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world economy.  
Money is not included and the prices of goods and assets are set relative to a global numeraire.  In 
the version used, the world is subdivided, consistent with the demographic sub-model, into the 14 
regions indicated in Table 2.  Industries are aggregated into the three sectors investigated in the 
previous section: food (including processed foods), industry (mining and manufacturing) and 
services.  To reflect composition differences between regions, these products are differentiated by 
region of origin, meaning that the “food” produced in one region is not the same as that produced 
in others.  Consumers substitute imperfectly between foods from different regions. 
As in other dynamic models of the global economy, the endogenous component of simulated 
economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  Technical change is introduced in the form of 
exogenous productivity growth that is sector and factor specific.  Skill (or human capital) 
acquisition is driven by constant transformation rates of production into skilled worker 
households.  A consequence of its capital accumulation dynamics and its incorporation of 
diminishing returns to all factor use is the Solow-Swan property that an increase in the growth 
rate of the population raises the growth rate of real GDP but reduces the level of real per capita 
income.
31  What distinguishes the model from Solow-Swan is the endogeneity of saving rates and 
its multi-product and multi-regional structure. 
All regional capital accounts are open and investors have adaptive expectations about real 
regional net rates of return on installed capital.  In each region the level of investment is 
determined by a comparison of expected net rates of return on domestic installed capital with 
borrowing rates yielded by a global trust, to which each region’s saving contributes, adjusted by 
calibrated region-specific interest premia.  Lagged adjustment processes ensure, however, that 
financial capital is not fully mobile internationally in the short run but that the paths of domestic 
and global interest rates become parallel, separated only by exogenous premia, in the long run.  In 
                                                 
31 See Pitchford (1974).   12
representing China, however, one caveat is that no explicit control is imposed on the outflow of 
private financial capital.  General financial reform is represented by a diminution of the interest 
premium and this causes an unambiguous influx of financial capital to China.  In reality, these 
reforms have tended to be associated with relaxation of controls so that, even though reserve 
accumulation may slow, private outflows could increase rendering the net effect of financial 
reforms on capital account flows more obscure than the model represents. 
To capture the full effects of demographic change, including those of ageing, the model 
incorporates multiple age, gender and skill groups compatible with its demography.  These 16 
groups differ in their shares of regional disposable incomes, consumption preferences, saving 
rates and their labour supply behaviour.  While the consumption-savings choice differs for each 
age-gender group, it is dependent for all on group-specific real per capita disposable income and 
the real lending rate.  Governments balance their budgets while private groups save or borrow.
32 
 
The real exchange rate: 
  We define the nominal exchange rate, E, according to modern convention, as the number 
of units of foreign exchange that might be obtained in return for a unit of the domestic currency.  
Since our modelling is in real terms it is then natural to define the real exchange rate, e
R, 
correspondingly, as the number of baskets of foreign produced goods and services for which a 
corresponding basket of domestically produced goods and services could be traded.  It follows 
that the bilateral real exchange rate for a focus country (China) with trading partner i depends on 




T ) and Pi
Y: 












 are indices over all the focus country’s traded and non-traded goods and services, 
respectively.
33  The corresponding real effective exchange rate is then a trade weighted average 
of these bilateral real exchange rates.  In our analysis, however, we focus on the bilateral real 
exchange rate against the region “North America”, since this best parallels China’s nominal 
exchange rate policy and the RMB valuation debate. 
                                                 
32 Unlike the standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private consumption, government 
consumption and total saving via an upper level Cobb-Douglas utility function that implies fixed regional saving 
rates, this adaptation first divides regional incomes between government consumption and total private disposable 
income and then allows endogeneity of group saving rates depending on real disposable income levels and real 
interest rates. 
33 A commonly used alternative measure (Hussain and Radelet, 2000) is the trade-weighted average of the ratio of 
the local consumer price to the wholesale price of each trading partner.  This measure retains prices of non-traded 
services in the numerator but not in the denominator.  For “small” open economies, this measure and the ratio of 
GDP deflators used in this paper follow very similar paths through time.   13
 
4 Constructing a Baseline 
The baseline scenario is a “business as usual” projection of the global economy through 2030.  
Although policy analysis can be sensitive to the content of this scenario, our focus is the extent of 
departures associated with shocks to the various determinants of China’s real exchange rate.  
Nonetheless, it is instructive to describe the baseline primarily because all scenarios have a 
common a set of assumptions about future trends in key exogenous variables and because some 
exposition of the baseline makes the construction of departures from it clearer.  We begin by 
discussing the various exogenous components of the projection and then offer a brief description. 
 
Shifts in consumption-saving preferences 
  Consumption-saving preferences are represented by age-gender specific consumption 
equations that relate real per capita consumption to real per capita income and the real lending 
rate in each region.  There is no endogeneity of saving rates to longevity even though death rates 
decline through time and 60+ life expectancy increases in all regions.  Consumption-saving 
preferences are shifted through time, however, in the few regions where changes are expected to 
stem from developments not represented in the model.  In particular, aged saving rates in East 
Asia are projected to decline.  Unlike the aged dissaving of Europe and North America, the aged 
of Asia are positive savers, due to high aged labour force participation rates and the mixing of 
incomes in extended families.  In China, the 60+ age group currently has low labour force 
participation but high state-financed retirement incomes.  Because the proportion of the aged 
retiring on relatively generous state pensions is declining, China’s 60+ groups are assumed to 
have underlying saving rates that fall through time. 
 
Exogenous factor productivity growth 
The model simulates growth due to the accumulation of labour, skill and physical capital.  
Other sources of growth, including all that passes for “technical change”, are introduced via 
exogenous productivity growth shocks.  These are applied separately for each of the model’s five 
factors of production (land, physical capital, natural resources, production labour and professional 
labour) and in each of the three sectors.  The overall rate of economic growth proves to be quite 
sensitive to these exogenous shocks since the larger these are for a particular region the larger is 
that region’s marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys higher levels of investment 
and hence a double boost to its growth rate.  Baseline productivity in the “food” sector is assumed   14
to grow more rapidly than that in the other sectors in China.  This allows continued shedding of 
labour to those sectors.
34  In general, baseline productivity growth rates in services are assumed 
to be slower than in the tradable goods sectors in all regions.  The baseline values of each 
productivity growth rate for China and North America are given in Table 4. 
 
Interest premia 
The model takes no explicit account of financial market maturity or investment risk and so 
tends to allocate investment to regions that have growing marginal products of physical capital.  
These tend to be labour-abundant developing countries with still rapidly expanding labour forces.  
Although these regions are attractive prospects for this reason, we know that considerations of 
financial market depth, segmentation and systemic risk limit the flow of foreign investment at 
present and that these are likely to remain important in the future.  To account for this we have 
constructed a “pre-base” simulation in which we set the relative growth rates of investment across 
regions as exogenous.  This allows us to capture the implied investment premium changes 
between the base year, 1997, and 2005, for which we have data on actual investment patterns.  
Thereafter, of course, while the pre-base path of investment in each region remains exogenous, 
values are judgemental.  Simulated global investment rises and falls depending on the level of 
global savings, but its allocation between regions is thus controlled.  To do this an interest 
premium variable is included in the model and made endogenous in this pre-baseline simulation.  
This creates wedges between international and regional borrowing rates.  The results show high 
interest premia for the populous developing regions of Indonesia, India, South America and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  In regions where labour forces are falling or growing more slowly premia tend 
to be smaller or to fall through time. 
In the case of China, investment is financed at an initial rate substantially above the Chinese 
government’s long term bond rate (the trend of which has exceeded the corresponding US rate by 
40 per cent).  The pre-base path of China’s domestic interest rate declines initially, wiping out 
most of the initial Chinese premium as shown in Figure 5.
35  This has the important consequence 
that the rental price of physical capital in China declines in the early years of the pre-base 
simulation.  Relatively competitive capital costs are therefore factors tending to force a 
depreciating trend in China’s pre-base real exchange rate.  The baseline simulation is then a 
                                                 
34 Wang and Ding (2006) have recently estimated that there are 40 million surplus workers in China’s agricultural 
sector.  While underemployment is not explicit in our model, the assumption of high labour productivity growth in 
agriculture implies that agriculture is capable of shedding labour more quickly than in other sectors.  This essentially 
mimics the surplus labour problem, which is thereby accounted for implicitly. 
35 See Tyers and Golley (2006) for further details.   15
repeat of the pre-base in which the trajectories of regional interest premia are set as exogenous 
and regional investment levels are made endogenous.  This simulation then forms the basis for 
comparison with others in which real exchange rate determinants are altered. 
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The baseline projection 
Overall baseline economic performance is suggested by Table 5, which details the average 
GDP and real per capita income growth performance of each region from 1997 to 2030.  In part 
because of its comparatively young population and hence its continuing rapid labour force 
growth, India attracts substantial new investment and is projected to take over from China as the 
world’s most rapidly expanding region.  Comparatively rapid population growth detracts from 
India’s long term real per capita income performance, however.  By this criterion, China is the 
strongest performing region through the three decades. 
 
5 Determinants of the Future Course of China’s Real Exchange Rate 
  Our focus is on shocks that enhance the rate of GDP growth.  These include productivity 
increases, factor endowment increases, skill transformation rate increases, birth rate increases, 
interest premium decreases, tariff decreases (increases in openness) and, less certainly as to 
direction, average saving rate increases.  Productivity growth is considered at the outset, followed 
by parameters primarily affecting endowment levels: the skill acquisition rate, the birth rate and 
the interest premium.  Finally, parameters that primarily affect aggregate demand and the balance 
of payments are considered.  These are the average saving rate and the level of openness on the 
current account as it is determined by trade policy.  In each case we make a new simulation in 
which the determinant in question is shocked once-and-for-all, as of 2005.  An elasticity of the 
real exchange rate to that determinant is then constructed, the value of which is tracked through 
time to 2030. 
 
Productivity growth 
To match our empirical analysis of sectoral productivity in China, we shock total factor 
productivity separately in each sector.
36  The resulting elasticities are indicated in Figure 6.  
Productivity growth in both tradables sectors yields real appreciations but “industry” is by far the 
most open and therefore the most significant for the real exchange rate.  The appreciating effects 
of tradable productivity increases are sustained, due to wage growth and Balassa service price 
inflation.  They are bolstered in the short run by increased investment and hence greater net 
inflows on the capital account.  In the long run, however, the enlargement of the capital stock 
reduces costs and hence offsets the real exchange rate gains.  Faster service productivity growth, 
                                                 
36 Labour productivity was also shocked but the results added little additional insight.  This is because the model has 
labour, skill and physical capital equally substitutable in every region.  Capital-skill complementarity would make 
labour productivity shocks more contrasting.  See Tyers and Yang (2000).   17
on the other hand, depreciates the real exchange rate, modestly in the early years but to a 
dominant extent in the long run when it is reinforced by associated capital accumulation. 
If productivity is boosted equi-proportionally in all sectors, the net effect is a small real 
appreciation in the short run and a substantial real depreciation in the long run.  There is no 
Balassa effect and hence no relative service price inflation.  Instead, the short run net appreciation 
stems from an associated rise in capital returns and hence from the attraction of increased 
investment from abroad.  Beyond a decade, as costs are reduced by the across-the-board rise in 
productivity, combined with the associated capital expansion, the elasticity turns negative and 
very quickly expands in that direction.  The particular strength of changes in service productivity 
is notable, suggesting that the forecasting of real exchange rates depends importantly on this 
difficult-to-measure behaviour.  Indeed, if our productivity estimates in Table 1 are correct, the 
difference between China’s productivity performance in tradables and services is not large.  This 
suggests that the net long run impact of productivity changes on China’s real exchange rate is 




  Economic growth also results from shocks to endowments of labour, skill and physical 
capital.  Such shocks depend on demographic change, the rate at which skill is acquired and the 
effects of financial reforms in reducing the premia that segment capital markets between regions. 
 
The skill acquisition rate 
  The model splits whole populations between production worker (unskilled) family 
members and professional worker (skilled) family members.  A fixed proportion of each region’s 
production worker family members are transformed in to professional family members in each 
age-gender group in each year.  When this rate is increased in developing regions like China, 
where the production worker population is larger than its professional counterpart, the 
proportional boost to the skill supply is larger than the proportional loss of production workers.  
The result is greater output and, other things equal, a real depreciation.  This tendency is 
exacerbated, however, by the fact that the services sector is comparatively intensive in skill, so 
that the shock causes a comparatively large boost to service output and hence a comparatively 
large fall in the service price.  The result is, then, a relatively large real depreciation. The 
elasticity shown in Figure 7 is constructed by raising the transformation rate once and for all by a 
                                                 
37 Whatever the relative performance of China’s services sector in the past, recent evidence suggests very substantial 
potential for catch-up and accelerated productivity growth in the future.  See Ma (2006).   18
small proportion, from 2005 onward.  It is the per cent departure of the real exchange rate for 
each per cent of the population in production worker families that is transformed each year.
38 As 
the figure shows, defined this way, skill transformation places downward pressure on the real 
exchange rate of magnitude similar to total factor productivity in services, at least in the long run. 
 
Birth rate 
  The birth rate affects the real exchange rate by raising the population (initially) and the 
labour force (subsequently).  The initial effect is to raise aggregate demand but not to contribute 
to supply since income is redistributed to the non-saving and non-working young.  Net inflows on 
the capital account rise and the real exchange rate appreciates.  In the long run, when the 
increased birth rate yields a larger workforce, the supply effects predominate.  Wage costs are 
lower and the real exchange rate declines.  Surprisingly, however, the elasticity to the birth rate, 
also shown in Figure 7, is comparatively small in magnitude.  Once again, it is calculated by 
imposing a once-and-for-all shock to the birth rate and dividing the per cent change in the real 
exchange rate by the percentage point increase in the birth rate.  The results suggest, somewhat 
surprisingly given the labour supply pattern of Figure 4, that China’s birth rate is only a modest 
contributor to the future of its real exchange rate. 
 
Interest premium decline 
  As represented in the model, in the short run, the decline in China’s interest premium 
raises investment and therefore increases aggregate demand and the real exchange rate.  A 
positive demand-driven effect is therefore expected in the first instance.
39  In the long run, 
however, when the effect of the investment on the capital stock is realised, the supply side 
dominates.  More abundant and hence cheaper capital reduces production costs, yielding a real 
depreciation.  Shown in Figure 8, the elasticity to premium decline is large and positive in the 
short run with the lag to the switch in sign at least 15 years.  It is calculated by imposing a once-
and-for-all shock to the premium and dividing the per cent change in the real exchange rate by 
the resulting percentage point increase in the home interest rate. 
 
                                                 
38 The elasticity would be much smaller were it to be defined based on the per cent change in the transformation rate 
itself. 
39 The model does not represent China’s restrictions on private financial outflow and the associated “bottling up” of 
domestic saving.  Even though the PBC has held massive foreign reserves on behalf of the Chinese private sector, if 
further financial reforms include the relaxation of these restrictions it is not clear whether the net short run effect will 
be financial influx or efflux.   19
Demand parameters 
  Other shocks influencing growth act primarily through changes in demand.  Those we 
consider here are a rise in the average saving rate and a reduction in trade distortions. 
 
Saving rate 
  Here, although saving by each age-gender-skill group is endogenous, we shift the 
underlying curves to achieve a small, once and for all increment to the average saving rate.  With 
the open capital account assumed in our modelling, this switches demand from consumption to 
financial capital, causing some leakage abroad.  It therefore reduces aggregate demand and hence 
the real exchange rate.  Because financial capital is not perfectly mobile internationally in the 
short run (though the model has it mobile in the long run), the additional home saving supply 
does reduce the home interest rate relative to the global one, and so it raises investment, offsetting 
somewhat the tendency for an initial real depreciation.  As time passes, the additional investment 
and its contribution to the capital stock further erodes the real depreciation.  In part because there 
are offsetting changes in flows on the capital account, the magnitude of the savings effect is 
small, as is also shown in Figure 8. 
 
Current account openness 
  Trade liberalisation switches demand away from home-produced goods and services 
toward imported varieties.  For a single region, the supply of goods and services from the much 
larger foreign market is more elastic than that of home varieties, constrained as they are by local 
factor supplies and technology.  The effect of the demand switch, then, is to reduce the relative 
prices of the home varieties and hence to depreciate the real exchange rate.  The elasticity of 
openness is constructed by dividing the per cent change in the real exchange rate by the 
percentage point change in the overall import penetration ratio (the ratio of the value of imports 
to the total value of domestic consumption).  The shock on which it is based is a phased removal 
of all China’s merchandise trade barriers over five years.
40  The elasticity proves to be quite large, 
with the expected negative sign, and it grows in magnitude through time.  The latter decline 
occurs because of the concentration of China’s merchandise protection in capital intensive 
industries.  Lower home product prices in these industries reduce average home capital returns 
and hence reduce investment and capital growth, enlarging the negative elasticity through time. 
 
                                                 
40 The elasticity is insensitive to the scale of the liberalisation though not to the composition of China’s protection.  
For the levels of protection embodied in the database for 1997 see Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).   20
The principal determinants of the real exchange rate in the short and long run 
  The elasticities of the strongest determinants of the Chinese real exchange rate are 
collected together in Figure 9.  The general pattern is that growth shocks tend to cause real 
appreciations in the short run, due primarily to the aggregate demand boost associated with 
financial capital influx, and real depreciations in the long run, the scale of which depends 
critically on the performance of the services sector.  Balassa forces are possible contributors in 
the medium term but the figure shows that they can readily be swamped by financial capital 
influx in the short run and by a combination of increased openness, human capital growth and 
services productivity in the long run. 
 
6 Conclusion 
  The magnitudes of the various links between the shocks that are instrumental in China’s 
growth performance and its real exchange rate are quantified.  Because of the key role of 
technical change, China’s productivity performance since the 1980s is first reviewed and then 
analysed numerically.  The results confirm very strong productivity growth, concentrated 
throughout the period in industrial sectors, with some acceleration late in the period in 
agricultural productivity, driven mainly by rural to urban migration.  Significantly, productivity 
in the largely non-traded service sector is measured as having been slower than in the tradeable 
sectors.  While the measured difference in productivity growth rates is not large it does leave 
scope for Balassa real appreciation effects and the associated relative inflation of service prices is 
observed since the mid 1990s. 
To examine the effects of the full variety of growth-related shocks on the real exchange 
rate, we turn to a dynamic model of the global economy with open capital accounts and labour 
supply behaviour fully underpinned by demographics.  A baseline “business as usual” simulation 
is constructed to 2030, wherein China’s growth rate slows considerably due to ageing and slower 
labour force growth.  Comparator simulations are then made for cases in which sectoral factor 
productivity is higher, the transition of production to professional worker families is faster, 
financial reform reduces China’s interest premium, trade reforms continue to open the economy 
and the average saving rate rises.  The effects of changes in fertility policy are also examined, 
along with demand shifting changes in saving rates and trade policy.  China’s real exchange rate 
realignments are examined in each case. 
The results suggest that, while population policy affects the real exchange rate in the 
directions expected, demographic change is not a strong determinant of the real exchange rate, at   21
least within the three decades examined.  In the short run the key determinant is net financial 
capital influx associated with the effects of financial reform on the interest premium.  This 
emerges as a strong appreciating force, though care is required in its interpretation since the 
model does not represent China’s restrictions on private financial outflow and the associated 
“bottling up” of domestic saving.  Even though the PBC has held massive foreign reserves on 
behalf of the Chinese private sector, if further financial reforms continue to relax these 
restrictions it is not clear whether the net effect will be financial influx or efflux. 
In the medium term, scope does emerge for Balassa real appreciation, if services 
productivity lags sufficiently.  In the long run, however, measured services sector lags are not 
sufficient to prevent real depreciation associated with improved services performance.  Because 
services are skill-intensive on average, their performance is bolstered by both productivity 
improvements and human capital growth.  And the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to these 
effects is so large as to make them dominant.  Since Chinese productivity growth has been higher 
than that of its trading partners for more than a decade, and considerable scope remains for 
productivity catch-up in services, these long run forces might be expected to bear down on the 
real exchange rate soon. 
The future path of China’s real exchange rate depends on the relative magnitudes of the 
effects considered here.  The opening of the Chinese economy since 2000 has integrated its 
financial and product markets with those abroad to an increasing extent.  Foreign investment has 
boomed and its temporary appreciating effect, combined with Balassa service productivity lags, 
may have outweighed the long run tendency of across-the-board productivity growth to cause real 
depreciation.  If service sector productivity growth continues to be comparatively weak and 
financial reform continues to reduce the interest premium, then real appreciations could also 
continue, at least temporarily.  It is difficult to ignore the fact, however, that the majority of the 
growth-related shocks examined, including overall (and particularly services) productivity 
growth, professional training and further trade reform, all cause the real exchange rate to 
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a  These are indices of nominal bilateral rates deflated according to  /
US
R YY eE P P =⋅ , where E is the nominal 
exchange rate in US$ per unit of local currency,  Y P  is the local GDP price and 
US

























a  These are annual rates of change in sectoral price indices implied by data from the China Statistical Abstract 
(2006).  “Primary industry” is mainly agriculture, “secondary industry” is primarily manufacturing and construction 
and “tertiary industry” is other services. 
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a  These are sectoral price indices implied by data from the China Statistical Abstract (2006).  “Primary industry” is 






















a  These are cumulative % departures from the base year 1997, drawn from the baseline simulation in which China’s 
fertility is projected to decline from 1.9 to 1.5. 
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a  This compares China’s borrowing rate in the baseline simulation with a “best overseas rate” that begins at a level 
consistent with the base period investment premium and increases through time with the simulated global interest 




Figure 6: Elasticity of the Projected Real Exchange Rate to the Rate of Total 
















a  This is the % departure of the projected real exchange rate for each % per year increase in total factor productivity 
in each of the three sectors after 2005.   28
Figure 7: Elasticity of the Projected Real Exchange Rate to the Fertility Rate 













a  This is the % departure of the projected real exchange rate for each % point change in the total fertility rate and for 
each additional % of the population of production worker families that is transformed annually to professional status. 
 
 
Figure 8: Elasticity of the Projected Real Exchange Rate to Trade Openness 



















a  This is the % departure of the projected real exchange rate for each 1) % increase in the overall import penetration 
ratio, 2) % point increase in the concurrent average saving rate (all group saving rates are shifted by equal 
proportions), and 3) % point reduction in the domestic interest rate due to a reduced premium, commencing in 2005.   29
 




















a  This is the % departure of the projected real exchange rate for each % increase in the overall import penetration 




Table 1: Estimated Chinese Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector 
% per year  Whole 
economy 
Food Industry  Services 
1986-1989  3.5 1.4  3.8  3.8 
1990-1994  5.0 1.6  7.7  2.3 
1995-1997  5.7 5.5  3.7  3.2 
1998-2001  4.1 -0.2  8.9  -0.5 
2002-2005  6.0 5.4  6.3  4.6 
Source: Analysis of Chinese statistics described in the text.  Original sources are, for output, China 
Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China 
Statistical Abstract (2006).  Employment data are from China Statistical Year Book (2005), China Industrial 
Economic Statistical Year Book (every year after 1985) and China Labor Statistical Year Book (every year after 
1985).  China’s capital stock, in 2000 prices, is taken from Holtz (2006).  Sectoral price indices are from China 








Table 2: Regional Composition in the Global Model 
Region  Composition of aggregates 
Australia  
North America  Canada, Mexico, United States 
Western Europe  European Union, including Switzerland and Scandinavia but excluding 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union 
Central Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Japan  
China  Includes Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Indonesia  
Other East Asia  Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
India  
Other South Asia  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, 
Uruguay 
Middle East and Nth Africa  Includes Morocco through the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Sub-Saharan Africa  The rest of Africa 
Rest of World  Includes the rest of Central America, the rest of Indochina, the small 
Island states of the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the 
Mediterranean Sea, Myanmar and Mongolia, New Zealand and the 
former Yugoslavia 
Source: The GTAP Global Database, Version 5. 




Table 3:  Baseline Transformation (Skill Acquisition) Rates and Labour Force Skilling
 
(Per cent of production worker household population transformed to professional each year) 
Region Rate  of 
transformation 

















Australia  0.12  16.3 30.6  31.2 
North America  0.30  29.8 26.3  26.3 
Western Europe  0.13  -9.4 30.7  31.2 
Central Europe  0.12  -11.8 24.8  25.8 
Japan  0.15  -7.8 31.5  32.3 
China  0.11  18.3 12.5  14.3 
Indonesia  0.10  48.6 10.6  10.7 
Other East Asia  0.11  43.2 15.7  16.5 
India  0.08  78.0 10.4  11.2 
Other South Asia  0.07  104.7 10.3 10.7 
South America  0.10  59.6 14.4  14.8 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.08  74.6 5.4 5.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.04  123.4 2.4 2.3 
Rest of World  0.10  60.8 16.3  16.0 
Source: Economy-wide skill subdivisions from the ILO Yearbook, various issues, projections by Goujon and Lutz 





Table 4:  Baseline (Projected) Factor Productivity Growth in China and North America 










China             3.1 
  Food  1.8 5.0  7.0  1.6 0.0  3.6 
  Industrial products  0.0 4.0  8.5  1.6 0.7  3.2 
  Services  0.0 2.1  6.0  1.6 0.0  2.8 
Nth America             2.3 
  Food  1.7 2.0  4.0  1.6 0.0  1.9 
  Industrial products  0.0 1.2  4.0  1.6 0.8  2.0 
  Services  0.0 1.4  5.2  1.6 0.0  2.5 
a  Productivity growth is specified by primary factor.  For display, sectoral averages are weighted by factor cost shares in each 
sector and regional averages by sectoral value added shares in each region. 
Source: Tyers et al. (2005). 





Table 5:  Baseline Real GDP and Real per capita Income Projections to 2030
a 
% change 2030 over 1997  Implied average annual growth rate, 
%/yr 
 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Australia  400 275  5.0  4.1 
North America  350 255  4.7  3.9 
Western Europe  227 276  3.7  4.1 
Central Europe & FSU  337 331  4.6  4.5 
Japan  214 313  3.5  4.4 
China  730 563  6.6  5.9 
Indonesia  253 242  3.9  3.8 
Other East Asia  409 467  5.1  5.4 
India  901 407  7.2  5.0 
Other South Asia  424 157  5.1  2.9 
South America  266 205  4.0  3.4 
Mid East & Nth Africa  319 152  4.4  2.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  373 150  4.8  2.8 
Rest of World  498 277  5.6  4.1 
a  For China the growth rate of GDP declines through time as it’s labour force declines. The average rate over the 
three decades therefore disguises high growth in the initial years.  In some regions, real per capita income grows 
faster than real GDP.  This is either because the population is declining or because there are substantial net factor 
income flows on the current account. 
Source: The baseline projection described in the text. 
 